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INTRODUCTION
At the core of every capital sentencing proceeding is a
guarantee that before condemning a person to die, the sentencer
must consider the humanity1 and dignity2 of the individual facing
the ultimate sanction. This principle—that “death is . . . different”
and, therefore, requires consideration of the “diverse frailties of
humankind”—echoes throughout the United States Supreme
Court’s Eighth Amendment jurisprudence.3 And yet courts are
reluctant to remedy the devastating impact of prosecutorial
arguments that dehumanize marginalized persons facing the
death penalty, condemning these arguments while nevertheless
“affirm[ing] resulting convictions based on procedural doctrines
such as harmless error.”4
These dehumanizing prosecutorial narratives are particularly
problematic—and effective—when used against LGBTQ+ people,
†
Jessica Sutton is an adjunct professor at University of Idaho College of Law.
John Mills is an adjunct professor of law at UC Hastings College of the Law. Jennifer
Merrigan is an adjunct assistant professor of law at both the Saint Louis University
and Washington University law schools. Kristin Swain, as well as the other authors,
is an attorney with Phillips Black, Inc., a non-profit dedicated to providing the highest
quality of representation to those facing the harshest penalties under law.
1
Woodson v. North Carolina, 428 U.S. 280, 304–05 (1976) (stating that in capital
cases, “fundamental respect for humanity underlying the Eighth Amendment”
requires individualized sentencing).
2
Trop v. Dulles, 356 U.S. 86, 100 (1958) (plurality opinion) (“The basic concept
underlying the Eighth Amendment is nothing less than the dignity of man.”); see also
John R. Mills et al., “Death Is Different” and a Refugee’s Right to Counsel, 42 CORNELL
INT’L L.J. 361, 373 (2009) (discussing dignitary interests protected by the Eighth
Amendment).
3
Woodson, 428 U.S. at 304–05.
4
Mary Nicol Bowman, Confronting Racist Prosecutorial Rhetoric at Trial, 71
CASE W. RES. L. REV. 39, 42 (2020); see, e.g., Darden v. Wainwright, 477 U.S. 168, 179
n.7, 180 n.12 (1986) (noting that the prosecutor referred to the crime as the work of “a
vicious animal,” and said that the defendant “shouldn’t be out of his cell unless he has
a leash on him and a prison guard at the other end of that leash”).
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whose very identities have been criminalized, pathologized, and
used as justification for condemning them to death.
Dehumanizing stereotypes not only reinforce and leverage social
biases as factors in aggravation, but also creates artificial barriers
to connecting with the person charged, “othering” LGBTQ+
defendants in such a way as to minimize the impact of mitigating
evidence.5
This Article explores the use of dehumanizing prosecutorial
narratives that target LGBTQ+ people in the pursuit of statesponsored execution and argues that such narratives violate the
Constitution’s protection of the dignity of persons facing the loss
of life or liberty. Part I examines the history of dehumanization
and criminalization of LGBTQ+ people, particularly those with
multiple marginalized identities. Part II sets forth examples of
the most common death-seeking portrayals of LGBTQ+
defendants, including the Woman-Hating Gay Predator, the
“Hardcore” Man-Hating Lesbian, and the Gender-Bending
Deviant. Part III analyzes how these dehumanizing stereotypes
further disadvantage LGBTQ+ defendants by undermining
mitigating evidence. Finally, Part IV, drawing inspiration from
the work of Pauli Murray, proposes a reframing of the
constitutional doctrines limiting prosecutorial arguments in
support of a death sentence, proposing that a focus on the dignity
of the individual and the dignitary harm to the individual should
be at the center of the inquiry.
I. HISTORY OF DEHUMANIZATION AND CRIMINALIZATION OF
LGBTQ+ PEOPLE
The use of homosexuality and gender transgressions against
those in the system of criminal sanction in the United States and,
specifically, those facing the death penalty, long predates the
“modern era” of the death penalty.6 It is rooted in early United
5

Study: Dehumanizing Belief Systems Linked to Support for Guns [sic] Rights,
the Death Penalty, and Anti-Immigration Practices, DEATH PENALTY INFO. CTR. (June
12, 2020), https://deathpenaltyinfo.org/news/study-dehumanizing-belief-systemslinked-to-support-for-guns-rights-the-death-penalty-and-anti-immigration-practices
[https://perma.cc/ZL7G-8J2Y] (citing David M. Markowitz & Paul Slovic, Social,
Psychological, and Demographic Characteristics of Dehumanization Toward
Immigrants, 117 PROC. NAT’L ACAD. SCI. 9260, 9268 (2020) (study finding “that
dehumanization is linked to ‘how people talk about ‘less than’ outgroups, adverse
childhood experiences, and perceived vulnerability in society’ ”)).
6
“The modern death penalty era begins with the Supreme Court’s ruling in
Furman v. Georgia, holding then-extant death penalty statutes unconstitutional in
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States history, traceable to the earliest days of the colonial period.7
The earliest American colonies intertwined homosexuality and
capital punishment, enacting laws making sodomy, buggery, and
in some instances, even lesbianism, a capital offense.8 Plymouth
Colony enacted the first American capital code in 1636, which
included witchcraft, sodomy, and buggery as crimes punishable by
death.9 In the same year, the General Court of Massachusetts
proposed a new law to add lesbianism as a capital offense.10 These
laws continued to spread throughout the colonies through much of
the 1600s, until, towards the end of the century, laws punishing
homosexuality shifted from capital to lesser sentences.11
The practice of criminalizing homosexual acts continued until
Lawrence v. Texas in 2003, when the United States Supreme Court
struck down sodomy laws targeting consenting same-sex adults.12
Only seventeen years earlier, the Court had upheld a similar
Georgia sodomy statute in which it characterized the
“[p]roscriptions against [sodomy]” as “hav[ing] ancient roots.”13 At
the time the Fourteenth Amendment was ratified, the Court
noted, “all but 5 of the 37 States in the Union had criminal sodomy
laws . . . [and] until 1961, all 50 States outlawed sodomy.”14 In
Lawrence v. Texas, however, the Court recharacterized its
position, asserting that the “ancient roots” argument it had used
to previously justify sodomy law was less about condemnation of
homosexuals, but instead was intended as a blanket prohibition of
nonprocreative sexual activity.15 Yet the Court’s decision to recast
the underpinnings of anti-sodomy laws failed to directly address
the homophobic sentiments underlying them, doing nothing to rid
the criminal legal system of anti-LGBTQ+ rhetoric and bias.
Instead, the court system continues to be a place where
homosexuality and gender identity are used against individuals,
including during capital prosecutions.

1972.” Brandon L. Garrett et al., The American Death Penalty Decline, 107 J. CRIM.
L. & CRIMINOLOGY 561, 583 (2017).
7
James Hampton, Homosexuality: An Aggravating Factor, 28 TUL. J.L. &
SEXUALITY 25, 27–30 (2019).
8
Id. at 27–28.
9
Id. at 27.
10
Id. at 27–28.
11
Id. at 29–30.
12
539 U.S. 558, 578 (2003).
13
Bowers v. Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186, 192 (1986).
14
Id. at 192–93 (footnotes omitted).
15
See Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 569–70.
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II. DEHUMANIZING PROSECUTORIAL NARRATIVES OF LGBTQ+
DEFENDANTS
Prosecutors have seized on this history of violence and
oppression to craft narratives that inflame jurors’ biases, strip
away a defendant’s humanity, and pave the way for a death
verdict. Below are four examples of how a prosecutor successfully
leveraged homophobia and anti-gender variance bias to impose the
ultimate penalty on LGBTQ+ defendants, two of whom were
women of color.
A.

Jay Wesley Neill: The Woman-Hating Gay Predator

On December 12, 2002, Jay Wesley Neill was executed for the
1984 murders of four people, including three women, in a
Geronimo, Oklahoma bank robbery.16 From the beginning, the
State of Oklahoma used homophobia to frame its robbery
investigation and ensuing trial.17 Early in the investigation, the
chief inspector for the Oklahoma State Bureau of Investigation
told the media that in “ ‘most cases of overkill . . . the perpetrator
turns out to be a homosexual,’ ”18 a feature that, he added, agents
were trained to recognize.19 A local district attorney told the press
that he immediately could tell from the bank robbery “ ‘[t]here had
to be sexual overtones towards the women. It had to be someone
with an emotional problem towards women and (who) needed to
feel superior to them.’ ”20 Another motive conveyed to the press by
law enforcement tasked with investigating the crime was that “the
killings might have been retaliation for an antigay slur made by
one of the victims.”21
Homophobic rhetoric persisted at trial.22 During his opening
statement, the prosecutor repeatedly referred to Mr. Neill as
homosexual and referenced his “homosexual lover[ ]” and co16
Joan W. Howarth, The Geronimo Bank Murders: A Gay Tragedy, 17 L. &
SEXUALITY 39, 39–40 (2008).
17
Id. at 49–51.
18
Id. at 50 (omission in original) (quoting Chris Brawley, Police, Psychiatrist
(June
16,
1985),
Dispute
Homosexual
Role,
OKLAHOMAN
https://www.oklahoman.com/story/news/1985/06/16/police-psychiatrists-disputehomosexual-role/62760636007 [https://perma.cc/PR7J-TKUM]). At the time of trial, a
person who engaged in “homosexual conduct” was guilty of “ ‘the detestable and
abominable crime against nature,’ ” punishable by up to 10 years in prison. Id. at 51–
52 (footnote omitted) (quoting OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 21, § 866 (West 2007)).
19
Id. at 50.
20
Id. (quoting Brawley, supra note 18).
21
Id. at 51.
22
Id. at 56.
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defendant.23 The opening statement was also replete with
references to “stereotypes about gay men, namely that they are
woman-hating, materialistic, flamboyant, flighty, superficial, and
selfish.”24 The prosecutor highlighted instances in which Mr. Neill
used the term “bitch” to refer to women and described that the codefendants flew to San Francisco to attend parties in the Castro
district, wore matching leather jackets, and brought a man back
to their hotel suite.25 Throughout the trial, the prosecutor
established Mr. Neill’s identity “as a flamboyant, misogynist,
materialistic, obsessive, sex-crazed, irresponsible homosexual”
who was prone to violence.26 Witnesses from the bank focused on
the sexual orientation of Mr. Neill and his co-defendant, describing
them as “certain people that draw attention.”27 “[T]he state
psychiatrist who testified that Neill was competent to stand trial
described him as ‘a little guy who wants to pout and put on a
show.’ ”28 Finally, the prosecution made clear in the penalty phase
that the reason to sentence Mr. Neill to death was that he was gay:
He is a homosexual. The person you’re sitting in judgment
on—disregard Jay Neill. You’re deciding life or death on a
person that’s a vowed [sic] homosexual. . . . I don’t want to
import to you that a person’s sexual preference is an
aggravating factor. It is not. But these are areas you
consider whenever you determine the type of person you’re
setting [sic] in judgment on. . . . The individual’s [a]
homosexual.29
Apparently effective, the jury complied with the prosecutor’s
request to sentence Mr. Neill to death. He was executed on
December 12, 2002.30

23

Id. (internal citation omitted).
Id.
25
Id.
26
Id. at 68.
27
Id. at 51 (quoting Chris Kinyon, Slaying Suspects Plagued by Debts,
OKLAHOMAN (Mar. 5, 1985), https://www.oklahoman.com/story/news/1985/03/05/
slaying-suspects-plagued-by-debts/62771885007 [https://perma.cc/2SP5-HH8T]).
28
Id. at 52–53 (quoting Chris Kinyon, Psychiatrist Says Killers Competent,
OKLAHOMAN (Sept. 2, 1987), https://www.oklahoman.com/story/news/1987/09/02/
psychiatrist-says-killers-competent/62678995007 [https://perma.cc/839D-YGVZ]).
29
Neill v. Gibson, 278 F.3d 1044, 1060–61 (10th Cir. 2001) (internal citation
omitted).
30
Bob Doucette, Geronimo Bank Slayer Executed at Penitentiary, OKLAHOMAN
(Dec. 13, 2002), https://www.oklahoman.com/article/2818651/geronimo-bank-slayerexecuted-at-penitentiary [https://perma.cc/M3N8-DEER].
24
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Bernina Mata: The “Hardcore” Man-Hating Lesbian

In the case of Bernina Mata, sexual orientation was presented
as the motive for the crime as well as a reason for the death
penalty.31 Ms. Mata, a Latina lesbian, was accused of fatally
stabbing John Draheim, a white heterosexual man, after meeting
him at a bar.32 The prosecution told the jury that “Ms. Mata killed
Mr. Draheim because he made an unwanted pass at her that
caused her, as a . . . ‘hard core lesbian,’ to kill him.”33
The prosecutorial narrative throughout the proceedings
centered on Ms. Mata’s sexual orientation.34 The State introduced
a mountain of evidence spanning ten witnesses concerning either
Ms. Mata’s lesbianism, book titles she owned touching on issues
concerning lesbianism—including THE LESBIAN READER—or both.
The State then cited that evidence to argue Ms. Mata’s motive to
kill.35 The prosecution also referred to Ms. Mata’s lesbian identity
on seventeen distinct occasions, asserting that she was “overtly
homosexual” and “proclaiming her sexuality to anyone who would
listen.”36
In addition to using Ms. Mata’s lesbian identity as a motive
for murder, the prosecutorial narrative of Ms. Mata as a “hard core
lesbian” was leveraged to prove the sole aggravating circumstance
underlying her death sentence—that she had “acted in a ‘cold,
calculated premeditated manner pursuant to a preconceived plan,
scheme or design.’ ”37 The State crafted this narrative by
exploiting the stereotype of a man-hating lesbian “who by nature
loathed men, was repulsed by men, and would harm a man who
dared to touch her,” thus inventing a narrative whereby “Ms. Mata
hatched a devious plan of revenge to lure the victim to her home
and kill him for making an unwanted pass at her.”38 The jury
agreed, convicting Ms. Mata in 1999 and sentencing her to death.39
31
Joey L. Mogul, The Dykier, the Butcher, the Better: The State’s Use of
Homophobia and Sexism to Execute Women in the United States, 8 N.Y.C L. REV. 473,
485, 487 (2005).
32
Id. at 484.
33
Id. at 473 (internal citation omitted).
34
Id. at 485.
35
Id.
36
Id. at 485–87 (internal citation omitted).
37
Id. at 487 (internal citation omitted).
38
Id.
39
Id. at 474; People v. Mata, 853 N.E.2d 110, 112–13, 117 (Ill. App. Ct. 2006). Ms.
Mata was spared execution in 2003, when Illinois Governor George Ryan commuted
the death sentences of 167 prisoners on the state’s death row. Id. at n.1. See GEORGE
H. RYAN SR. WITH MAURICE POSSLEY, UNTIL I COULD BE SURE: HOW I STOPPED THE
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Wanda Jean Allen: The Gender-Bending Deviant

The prosecutorial narrative in the case of Wanda Jean Allen
focused on perceived gender transgressions as a reason for death.40
Wanda Allen was convicted of the 1989 murder of her lover, Gloria
Leathers, in Oklahoma City.41 Throughout the trial, the State
emphasized the ways in which Ms. Allen deviated from social
constructions of womanhood.42 The prosecutors portrayed her as
the “man” in the “homosexual relationship.”43 The prosecutor
argued to the jury that Ms. Allen “wore the pants in the family”
and spelled her middle name “G-E-N-E,” calling attention to the
stereotypically masculine spelling.44 This evidence, he told the
jury, was relevant to show that Ms. Allen “was the aggressive
person in the relationship,” while Ms. Leathers was “more
passive.”45 The strategy was successful; in 1989, Ms. Allen was
convicted and sentenced to death.46
On appeal, the Court of Criminal Appeals of Oklahoma held
that the trial court did not err in admitting the above evidence
and, in effect, the related argument.47 Dissenting, Judge James F.
Lane expressed his belief that such evidence was introduced solely
to devalue the life of the defendant:
I also take exception to the majority finding the evidence
the appellant was the “man” in her lesbian relationship has
any probative value at all. Were this a case involving a
heterosexual couple, the fact that a male defendant was the
“man” in the relationship likewise would tell me nothing. I

DEATH PENALTY IN ILLINOIS 136 (2020); David Blanchette, George Ryan Looks Back,
ILL. TIMES (Sept. 9, 2021), https://www.illinoistimes.com/springfield/george-ryanlooks-back/Content?oid=14050079 [https://perma.cc/KHY7-LH5T]; Lee Hockstader,
Dead Men Walking, WASH. POST (Feb. 23, 2003), https://www.washingtonpost.com/
archive/lifestyle/magazine/2003/02/23/dead-men-walking/15867492-fda4-4060-873bddf02a207b0d.
40
Mogul, supra note 31, at 489–90.
41
Id. at 489.
42
Id.
43
Id. at 490 (quoting Allen v. State, 871 P.2d 79, 95 (Okla. Crim. App. 1994)).
44
Id. (first citing Allen, 871 P.2d at 97; then quoting Richard Goldstein, Queer on
Death Row, VILLAGE VOICE (Mar. 13, 2001), https://www.villagevoice.com/2001/03/13/
queer-on-death-row [https://perma.cc/8RCV-FQNL]).
45
Allen, 871 P.2d at 95. This prosecutorial tactic of ascribing stereotypically
feminine traits to Ms. Leathers served make her a more sympathetic victim, despite
her lesbian identity. Mogul, supra note 31, at 490. Interestingly, Ms. Leathers had
killed a woman in Tulsa, Oklahoma, ten years prior to her death, information which
was presented by Ms. Allen as part of her self-defense claim. Id. at 490 n.69.
46
Id. at 491.
47
Allen, 871 P.2d at 95.
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find no proper purpose for this evidence, and believe its
only purpose was to present the defendant as less
sympathetic to the jury than the victim.48
The majority view, however, prevailed and Ms. Allen was
executed in 2001.49
D. Aileen Wuornos: The Money Hungry Lesbian Prostitute
Aileen Wuornos was portrayed by the prosecution and the
media as a money- and sex-hungry prostitute.50 The media ran
with these stereotypes, exploiting the story about the woman they
dubbed “ ‘ “the man-hating murderer,” apparently because
Wuornos was an admitted lesbian.’ ”51 “The themes of lesbianism,
man-hating, deceitfulness, greed, deviance, and manipulativeness
that frame the stories society tells itself about women who use
violence pervade the transcripts and media reports of the Wuornos
trials.”52
The defense presented mitigating evidence to explain how she
was forced into prostitution at an early age.53 Ms. Wuornos was
raised by her alcoholic grandparents, who were both physically
and verbally abusive to her.54 She had been taken in and adopted
by them after her mother abandoned her and her father hanged
himself while in prison.55 In junior high, she started having
problems in school, some of which were facilitated by loss of
hearing and vision, and she was given a mild tranquilizer to
improve her behavior.56 The defense also presented evidence that
at age fourteen, she “was raped by a family friend,” which resulted
in a pregnancy.57 She kept the pregnancy hidden for six months
and then was shamed by her grandparents who “blamed her for
the pregnancy” and “forced her to give up the child for adoption.”58
After this, Ms. Wuornos was not allowed back in her home, leaving
48

Id. at 105 (Lane, J., dissenting).
Case Summaries of Executed Women, DEATH PENALTY INFO. CTR.,
https://deathpenaltyinfo.org/stories/case-summaries-of-executed-women
[https://perma.cc/K99K-AHEY] (last visited Mar. 22, 2022).
50
Chimène I. Keitner, Victim or Vamp? Images of Violent Women in the Criminal
Justice System, 11 COLUM. J. GENDER & L. 38, 59 (2002).
51
Id. at 58 (internal citations omitted).
52
Id.
53
Wuornos v. State, 644 So.2d 1000, 1005 (Fla. 1994) (per curiam).
54
Id.
55
Id.
56
Id.
57
Id.
58
Id.
49
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her to live on the streets, where she began engaging in sex work
and abusing drugs and alcohol.59 Her sex work continued into
adulthood, and “[a]t about age 20, [Wuornos] settled in Florida,
and began working as a highway prostitute at least four days of
the week. Her job was dangerous, she said. On some occasions
she had been maced, beaten, and raped by customers.”60
The defense presented evidence to mitigate the crime,
conceptualizing for the jury how Wuornos was brutally raped by
her victim, Richard Mallory, prior to killing him.61
The
prosecution minimized the dangers and horrors inflicted on
prostitutes generally, and Wuornos specifically, by arguing that
she killed to be in “ ‘control’ ” and out of a voracious appetite for
sex and money.62 The prosecution argued during closing that
Wuornos was not a victim—that being a prostitute was her
“preferred way to make a living” and that she “indicated she likes
sex.”63
The prosecution was able to use this dehumanizing narrative
to minimize any impact the defense’s mitigating evidence had on
the jury.64 Ultimately, the jury and the courts sided with the
prosecution’s interpretation of Ms. Wuornos’s life history.65 The
Supreme Court of Florida’s per curiam opinion focused on two
aspects of who Aileen Wuornos was: her sexuality and her sex
work.66 In upholding her sentence of death, after briefly discussing
the victim’s body being found, the court first noted that Ms.
Wuornos and Tyria Moore “lived together as lovers for about four
and a half years” and that “Wuornos worked as a prostitute along
Central Florida highways.”67
III. THE PROSECUTION’S USE OF STEREOTYPES TO UNDERMINE
MITIGATING EVIDENCE
In each of these cases, prosecutors relied on degrading
homophobic stereotypes to both enhance the aggravated nature of
the crimes as well as dehumanize the defendants, turning
evidence of their “diverse frailties”against them, in support of an
59
60
61
62
63
64
65
66
67

Id.
Id. at 1004.
Id. at 1004; see Keitner, supra note 50, at 59–60.
Keitner, supra note 50, at 59 (internal citation omitted).
Id. at 62 (internal citation omitted).
Id. at 63–64.
Id. at 64–65.
Wuornos, 644 So.2d at 1003.
Id.
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argument that they should not be permitted to live, even in
prison.68 Yet this is directly contrary to the mandate of the United
States Supreme Court, which has recognized the critical role that
mitigation plays in capital cases.69 Sentencing juries in death
penalty cases must be able to consider all available mitigating
evidence about the defendant, regardless of whether it has a
specific nexus to the crime.70
The Constitution requires
individualized sentencing where mitigating evidence is not
restricted and is “fully consider[ed].”71 The presentation of
mitigating evidence is often the difference between a life and death
sentence, even in highly aggravated cases.72 The purpose of
presenting such evidence is to humanize the individual facing a
death sentence, helping the jury to see beyond the crime in order
that they might show mercy.
In these cases, however, the prosecutors argued that that the
mitigation was actually aggravating, or “double-edged.”73 Though
arguably unconstitutional, this tactic has been reinforced in some
jurisdictions where courts have found that a failure to present
significant mitigating evidence, or even uncover it through
68

Woodson v. North Carolina, 428 U.S. 280, 304 (1976).
See Wiggins v. Smith, 539 U.S. 510, 537 (2003) (“Had the jury been able to place
petitioner’s excruciating life history on the mitigating side of the scale, there is a
reasonable probability that at least one juror would have struck a different balance.”);
Porter v. McCollum, 558 U.S. 30, 41 (2009) (per curiam) (finding ineffective assistance
of counsel where the jury “heard almost nothing that would humanize Porter or allow
them to accurately gauge his moral culpability”).
70
Elizabeth S. Vartkessian, Dangerously Biased: How the Texas Capital
Sentencing Statute Encourages Jurors to be Unreceptive to Mitigation Evidence, 29
QUINNIPIAC L. REV. 237, 237–38 (2011).
71
Kathryn E. Miller, The Eighth Amendment Power to Discriminate, 95 WASH.
L. REV. 809, 836 (2020) (discussing Abdul-Kabir v. Quarterman, 550 U.S. 233, 267
(2007); Brewer v. Quarterman, 550 U.S. 286, 289 (2007); and Penry v. Johnson (Penry
II), 532 U.S. 782, 800 (2001)).
72
See, e.g., Porter, 558 U.S. at 32–33, 43 (finding prejudice in part because
evidence of his “abusive childhood” “may have particular salience for a jury” in the
murder of an ex-girlfriend that was especially “heinous, atrocious, or cruel”); Rompilla
v. Beard, 545 U.S. 374, 378, 393 (2005) (finding prejudice in case where “murder was
committed by torture” and where defendant had “significant history” of violent felony
convictions because omitted mitigating evidence of extreme emotional and physical
childhood trauma contributed “to a mitigation case that bears no relation” to what the
jury heard); Williams v. Taylor, 529 U.S. 362, 367–68, 398 (2000) (internal citation
omitted) (finding prejudice where evidence omitted at trial of “Williams’ childhood,
filled with abuse and privation” despite a brutal killing over “a couple of dollars” and
where aggravating evidence was presented at sentencing including evidence of arson
and other brutal assaults on elderly victims).
73
See John H. Blume & Sheri Lynn Johnson, The Fourth Circuit’s “Double-Edged
Sword”: Eviscerating the Right to Present Mitigating Evidence and Beheading the
Right to the Assistance of Counsel, 58 MD. L. REV. 1480, 1480–81 (1999).
69
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reasonable investigation, is not prejudicial under Strickland74 if a
jury could potentially find the evidence to be “two-edged.”75
This becomes doubly problematic in cases involving
marginalized defendants, where prosecutors may prey on the very
traits and experiences which make an individual more vulnerable.
In capital cases involving LBGTQ+ defendants, prosecutors often
diminish the impact of compelling mitigation by relying on
negative stereotypes to argue that the mitigation presented is
actually aggravating, or “two-edged.”76 The use of prosecutorial
narratives against women and LGBTQ+ individuals are often
rooted in the societal norms that are enforced in and out of the
courtroom. For instance, “[t]he demonization of violent women in
American society illustrates one way in which a country’s criminal
justice system, including both its formal and informal components,
constructs and reinforces norms of appropriate behavior—norms
that encompass more than the proscribed acts at issue in a given
trial.”77 This is in large part due to the idea that “violent women
have committed a double transgression,” both by committing a
violent crime and by “violati[ng] . . . sex-role boundaries.”78
Intersectionality further exacerbates the stereotypes used by the
prosecution to strip the defendant of humanity.
As in the cases discussed in Part II, the prosecution was able
to use the very details of the defendants’ respective identity to urge
the jury to see them as less, not more, human. Each defendant’s
attempts to live authentically with respect and dignity were
portrayed as aggressive threats against society. An individual’s
refusal to comply with gender and sexual norms became their
refusal to comply with societal rules. Their desire to be with a
person of the same sex was transformed into a hatred of the
opposite sex. Their efforts to find love and partnership were
painted as deviant criminal acts, in accordance with this country’s
penal history, as discussed in Part I.
In the case of Charles Rhines, jurors voted to execute him
instead of allowing him to live in prison because of the risk that he
might be “a ‘sexual threat to other inmates and take advantage of

74

Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 691 (1984).
Blume & Johnson, supra note 73, at 1496 (quoting Gilbert v. Moore, 134 F.3d
642, 654–55 (4th Cir. 1998) (en banc)).
76
Id.
77
Keitner, supra note 50, at 40.
78
Id.
75
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other young men in or outside of prison.’ ”79 At trial, the
prosecution presented evidence that Mr. Rhines was gay, which
later led the jurors in his case to send a note to the judge asking
about what life in prison would be like for Mr. Rhines if they were
to give him a life sentence.80 Based on the jurors’ notes, it was
clear that the jury was fixated on Mr. Rhines’ ability to interact
with other men, specifically those in general population.81 Later
investigation revealed that Mr. Rhines’ sexuality was a central
discussion point during jury deliberation, including sentiments of
“disgust” and expressions that giving Rhines, “[t]hat SOB queer,”
a life sentence would “be sending him where he wants to go” so
that he could “spend his life with men in prison.”82
By capitalizing on stereotypes, homophobia, and bigotry,
prosecutors are also able to exploit the very vulnerabilities that
should support a cry for mercy. For example, trauma histories are
often conveyed to a jury in order to compel mercy, to explain
behavior as compulsive rather than premeditative, or to help the
jury see the defendant as a whole person.83 However, in the cases
of some LGBTQ+ defendants, prosecutors have argued that their
trauma history is actually aggravating rather than mitigating.84
A prior rape or sexual assault becomes support for the prosecutor’s
argument of future dangerousness.85 In the Wuornos case, Ms.
Wuornos’s own trauma history was used to paint her as more
dangerous rather than as a person who spent her life in danger.86
Prosecutors have also used an individual’s sexual orientation to
minimize evidence of their remorse.87 All of these tactics strip the

79

Petition for a Writ of Habeas Corpus at 7, In re Rhines, 140 S. Ct. 488 (2019)
(No. 19-6479) (internal citation omitted); see also Daniel S. Harawa, Sacrificing
Secrecy, 55 GA. L. REV. 593, 603 (2021) (“On November 4, 2019, South Dakota executed
Mr. Rhines in the face of compelling evidence that his sexual orientation played a
critical role in the jury’s decision to sentence him to die.”).
80
Petition for a Writ of Habeas Corpus, supra note 79, at 2–3.
81
Id. at 3.
82
Id. at 3, 7 (alteration in original) (internal citations omitted).
83
See Kathleen Wayland, The Importance of Recognizing Trauma Throughout
Capital Mitigation Investigations and Presentations, 36 HOFSTRA L. REV. 923, 924,
926 (2008); Hampton, supra note 7, at 32–33.
84
See Hampton, supra note 7, at 33, 37–38.
85
Id. at 36–37 (describing how the prosecutor in Calvin Burdine’s case—who was
a gay man on trial for his lover’s murder—stated that “[t]he only way to stop Burdine
and make society safe . . . was to put him to death”).
86
See Keitner, supra note 50, at 59.
87
Hampton, supra note 7, at 37–38. Eddie Hartman was sentenced to death after
the prosecutor used his sexuality to minimize repeated sexual abuse by older male
relatives during his childhood. Id. at 38. In response to testimony regarding the abuse,
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defendant of dimension and inhibit the life-saving “recognition of
a kinship” between the accused and the decisionmaker, “which
evokes the response ‘here but for the grace of God, drop I.’ ”88
IV. REMEDYING THE HARM BY REFOCUSING ON THE DIGNITY OF
THE HARMED.
The present treatment of these dignity-defying and humanitydenying narratives fails to give full meaning to the constitutional
protection for the dignity of persons facing loss of life or liberty. It
has long been recognized that, from the state, “improper
suggestions [and] insinuations” have no proper weight in criminal
cases.89 Moreover, although a prosecutor “may strike hard blows,
he is not at liberty to strike foul ones.”90 But to establish a
constitutional violation under present doctrine, “it ‘is not enough
that the prosecutors’ remarks were undesirable or even
universally condemned.’ ”91 Instead, an improper suggestion or
insinuation from a prosecutor must have “ ‘so infected the trial
with unfairness as to make the resulting conviction a denial of due
process.’ ”92 And in making that assessment, courts do “not lightly
infer that a prosecutor intends an ambiguous remark to have its
most damaging meaning.”93

the prosecutor asked Hartman’s mother during cross-examination, “Is your son not a
homosexual?” Id. Over the defense’s repeated objections, the prosecutor argued that
he questioned witnesses about Hartman’s sexuality “because shortly after he shot the
victim he engaged in ‘homosexual activity’ with one of the State’s witnesses” and that
this showed his lack of remorse. Id. The court sustained defense counsel’s objections,
but the damage was done, though the defense correctly pointed out that these
questions were merely a thinly veiled attempt to argue to the jury that Hartman was
“asking for it” when he was being abused; the prosecution was thus able to minimize
the horrors that Hartman suffered as a youth. Id. at 37–38.
88
Russell Stetler, The Mystery of Mitigation: What Jurors Need to Make a
Reasoned Moral Response in Capital Sentencing, 11 U. PA. J.L. & SOC. CHANGE 237,
241 (2008) (quoting Witherspoon v. Illinois, 391 U.S. 510, 520 n.17 (1968)).
89
Berger v. United States, 295 U.S. 78, 88 (1935); see also Pool v. Superior Court
of Pima Cty., 677 P.2d 261, 266 (Ariz. 1984) (“It is the prosecutor’s duty to refrain from
improper methods calculated to produce a wrongful conviction just as it is his duty to
use all proper methods to bring about a just conviction.”).
90
Berger, 295 U.S. at 88; see also CRIMINAL JUSTICE STANDARDS FOR THE
PROSECUTION
FUNCTION
§
3-6.8(c)
(AM.
BAR
ASS’N
2017)
https://www.americanbar.org/groups/criminal_justice/standards/ProsecutionFunctio
nFourthEdition [https://perma.cc/W2ZR-4HZT] (“The prosecutor should not make
arguments calculated to appeal to improper prejudices of the trier of fact.”).
91
Darden v. Wainwright, 477 U.S. 168, 180–81 (1986) (internal quotations
omitted).
92
Id. at 181 (quoting Donnelly v. DeChristoforo, 416 U.S. 637, 643 (1974)).
93
Donnelly, 416 U.S. at 647.
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This high bar—an unambiguous argument infecting the
entire trial—has led appellate courts to frequently find fault, but
no error. That is, even where a prosecutor’s argument crosses a
line into unprofessional conduct via “improper suggestions [and]
insinuations,”94 courts affirm the convictions in question, even
when the argument is made concerning whether a defendant will
live or die,95 a context in which courts must provide a “greater
degree of scrutiny.”96
As with other forms of state misconduct, “[t]here is a passel of
reasons for these affirmances.”97 As others have explored, these
dynamics play out when the state uses religious arguments to
support its case for a sentence of death.98 In one study cataloguing
cases in which a court found that a prosecutor had made an
improper religious argument, only a small fraction resulted in a
reversal.99 And even among those, most were in the handful of
jurisdictions that had a bright line rule against any religious
argument.100 The authors observed that the most common reasons
for a lack of reversal were counsel’s failure to object, the appellate
court concluding that the religious argument was somehow invited
by the defendant, and that although there was error, the error was
not sufficiently pervasive or was otherwise harmless.101 Thus,
despite repeated findings of misconduct, it was rare for a court to
find that the misconduct so pervaded the proceedings that the
Constitution required reversal.
With regards to race, however, at least at a doctrinal level,
courts appear to more readily find a pervasive impact on the
proceedings. Courts consistently condemn the use of “racially
biased prosecutorial arguments” and provide relief to the injured
party—the person suffering from a conviction or sentence on the

94

Berger, 295 U.S. at 88.
See, e.g., In re Martinez, 462 P.3d 36, 41–43 (Ariz. 2020) (collecting five death
penalty cases where the court found that the same prosecutor committed misconduct
in each case but affirmed the convictions and sentences).
96
Turner v. Murray, 476 U.S. 28, 35–36 (1986) (quoting California v. Ramos, 463
U.S. 992, 999 (1983)).
97
Sheri Lynn Johnson, Racial Imagery in Criminal Cases, 67 TULANE L. REV.
1739, 1776 (1993).
98
See John H. Blume & Sheri Lynn Johnson, Don’t Take His Eye, Don’t Take His
Tooth, and Don’t Cast the First Stone: Limiting Religious Arguments in Capital Cases,
9 WM. & MARY BILL RTS. J. 61, 82–83 (2000).
99
Id. at 83–84.
100
Id.
101
Id. at 82–83.
95
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basis of such arguments.102 Courts recognize that the invocation
of racial prejudice, although “odious in all aspects, is especially
pernicious in the administration of justice.”103 Indeed, when the
state discriminates on the basis of race during jury selection,
reversal is always required.104
The Supreme Court’s consistent and high-minded rhetoric in
its racial justice jurisprudence offer hints at how it can give
meaning to its bar on the prosecution’s use of “improper
suggestions [and] insinuations.”105 Instead of a focus on the peril
to the proceedings, courts should focus attention on the dignitary
harm to the individual. After all, this is the essence of the countermajoritarian undertaking of protecting against mob rule: to insist
on the dignity of “discrete and insular minorities.”106 This is what
the Court did in 1932, when it stood against the lynch mob and
show trial in Ozie Powell’s case, holding that Powell was entitled,
as a matter of due process of law, to a lawyer in his capital case.107
The Court in his case provided the groundwork for what we now
consider “bedrock” constitutional guarantees, including the right
to counsel.108

102
McCleskey v. Kemp, 481 U.S. 279, 309 n.30 (1987); Buck v. Davis, 580 U.S.
100, 119 (2017) (citing Zant v. Stephens, 462 U.S. 862, 885 (1983)) (“It would be
patently unconstitutional for a state to argue that a defendant is liable to be a future
danger because of his race.”).
103
Rose v. Mitchell, 443 U.S. 545, 555 (1979); see also McCleskey, 481 U.S. at 309
(quoting Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79, 85 (1986)) (“[Courts are] engaged in
‘unceasing efforts’ to eradicate racial prejudice from our criminal justice system.”);
Bennett v. Stirling, 842 F.3d 319, 321 (4th Cir. 2016)) (“While recognizing full well the
deferential standard of review under AEDPA, we nonetheless agree with the district
court that the sentencing was suffused with racially coded references to a degree that
made a fair proceeding impossible.”); but see McCleskey, 481 U.S. at 309 (upholding
Georgia’s death penalty despite statistical evidence that it was applied in a racially
discriminatory manner).
104
See Flowers v. Mississippi, 139 S. Ct. 2228, 2235 (2019); Arizona v.
Fulminante, 499 U.S. 279, 310 (1991); Crittenden v. Chappell, 804 F.3d 998, 1003 (9th
Cir. 2015) (emphasis added) (“[I]t is well established that a Batson violation is
structural error.”).
105
Berger v. United States, 295 U.S. 78, 88 (1935).
106
United States v. Carolene Products Co., 304 U.S. 144, 152 n.4 (1938); see also
ALEXANDER M. BICKEL, THE LEAST DANGEROUS BRANCH: THE SUPREME COURT AT
THE BAR OF POLITICS 17 (1962) (discussing the “counter-majoritarian” dilemma of
acting against the interests of the popularly elected branches).
107
See Powell v. Alabama, 287 U.S. 45, 67–69 (1932); McDonald v. City of Chicago,
561 U.S. 742, 761–64 (2010) (discussing the Court’s rejection of Justice Black’s “total
incorporation” theory, but holding that “the Due Process Clause fully incorporates
particular rights contained in the first eight Amendments”).
108
Martinez v. Ryan, 566 U.S. 1, 12 (2012) (first quoting Gideon v. Wainwright,
372 U.S. 335, 344 (1963); then citing Powell, 287 U.S. at 68–69 (1932)).
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But the Court’s work in Powell was decidedly countermajoritarian, and, even as it minimized the physical threat of
harm Powell and his co-defendants faced, the Court grounded its
reasoning in the dignitary harms he faced in a trial for his life.109
The recitation of the only facts “necessary” to resolve the case
begin with the defendants’ race: “these defendants, together with
a number of other negroes . . . .”110 The case then recounted how a
group of “white boys” got into a fight with the defendants, leading
to a near miss with a lynch mob in the deep South.111 The capital
trial was allowed to go forward, despite the failure of the trial court
to appoint counsel.112 The Supreme Court reversed, expressing
outrage that the “defendants, young, ignorant, illiterate,
surrounded by hostile sentiment, haled back and forth under
guard of soldiers, charged with an atrocious crime regarded with
especial horror in the community where they were to be tried, were
thus put in peril of their lives” without having been previously
provided counsel.113
That dignitary interest undergirding the Court’s reasoning in
Powell is a value that gives meaning and life to the due process
protection the Constitution provides.114 It is our collective
insistence that a person, at a minimum, be given notice and an
opportunity to be heard.115 And it protects a person’s dignity when
their life and livelihood are imperiled by state actors.116 But as
civil rights pioneer Pauli Murray long ago insisted, the
Constitution’s prioritization of dignity has even deeper roots, roots
that took hold in soil wet with bloodshed.117 As Murray has
argued, the Thirteenth Amendment’s bar on enslavement makes
concrete the notion that enslavement is contrary to the dignity of

109

Powell, 287 U.S. at 50–53.
Id. at 50.
111
Id. at 50–52; see also EQUAL JUST. INITIATIVE, LYNCHING IN AMERICA:
CONFRONTING THE LEGACY OF RACIAL TERROR 39–43 (3d ed. 2017), https://eji.org/wpcontent/uploads/2005/11/lynching-in-america-3d-ed-110121.pdf
[https://perma.cc/H3F5-3A5W].
112
See Powell, 287 U.S. at 53–56.
113
Id. at 57–58.
114
See id.
115
See In re Oliver, 333 U.S. 257, 273 (1948) (“A person’s right to reasonable notice
of a charge against him, and an opportunity to be heard in his defense . . . are basic in
our system of jurisprudence.”).
116
See Powell, 287 U.S. at 71–72.
117
Dahlia Lithwick, Who Was Pauli Murray?, SLATE (Aug. 31, 2021),
https://slate.com/news-and-politics/2021/08/my-name-is-pauli-murray-directorsinterview.html [https://perma.cc/QU2N-WRNC].
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the individual.118 And it was only after the Civil War that we
adopted the Fourteenth Amendment, which both guaranteed
equal protection of the law and applied due process protections to
both federal and state action and, ultimately, applied the Bill of
Rights to limit state action.119
These limits on state action include the First Amendment’s
guarantees of free speech and religious practice, which
constitutionally enshrine an individual’s dignity interest in their
own thoughts.120
These limits also, through the Fourth
Amendment, guard “against unreasonable searches and seizures,”
which protects both bodily integrity and the privacy of the home.121
And, perhaps most powerfully, the Eighth Amendment empowers
the judiciary to protect the dignitary interests of those whose lives
and liberty are being threatened in criminal court proceedings.122
Refocusing the inquiry on the dignity of the individual—as
opposed to the court’s own interests in an uninfected trial—better
reflects the Constitution’s guarantee that each person in a
criminal case will be treated with dignity. A grounding in dignity
is also better at “keep[ing] the Constitution relevant, useful, and
compelling to ‘the people’ in the present day.”123 There is no

118
U.S. CONST. amend. XIII, § 1 (“Neither slavery nor involuntary servitude,
except as a punishment for crime whereof the party shall have been duly convicted,
shall exist within the United States, or any place subject to their jurisdiction.”);
Florence Wagman Roisman, Lessons for Advocacy from the Life and Legacy of the
Reverend Doctor Pauli Murray, 20 U. MD. L. J. RACE, RELIGION, GENDER & CLASS 1,
34 (2020) (crediting Murray with developing the legal theories that extended the
Thirteenth Amendment’s reach to “counter other badges and incidents of slavery,”
regardless of the presence of state action).
119
See U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1. Although the “incorporation doctrine,” the
application of the Bill of Rights to state and federal government action alike, is
frequently attributed to the “Warren Court,” its origins are properly traced to an
earlier Court, which began the task of regulating unconstitutional behavior of state
officials—first in the context of the First Amendment, but then with increasing
regularity in the context of death penalty cases in southern states. See Gitlow v. New
York, 268 U.S. 652, 666 (1925); Powell, 287 U.S. at 71; Brown v. Mississippi, 297 U.S.
278, 287 (1936); Chambers v. Florida, 309 U.S. 227, 240–41 (1940).
120
U.S. CONST. amend. I.
121
Id. amend. IV.
122
Id. amend. VIII.
123
Trevor W. Morrison, Lamenting Lochner’s Loss: Randy Barnett’s Case for a
Libertarian Constitution, 90 CORNELL L. REV. 839, 851 (2005) (book review); see also
Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 579 (2003) (“As the Constitution endures, persons
in every generation can invoke its principles in their own search for greater freedom.”);
William J. Brennan, Jr., The Constitution of the United States: Contemporary
Ratification, 19 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 2, 7 (1985) (“[T]he genius of the Constitution rests
not in any static meaning it might have had in a world that is dead and gone, but in

1070

ST. JOHN’S LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 95:1053

question that dignity today means something quite different than
it did to our framers.124 However, the constitutional conveners in
1792 and 1868 had the wisdom and vision to protect each
individual’s dignitary interests over and over again.
Centering an analysis of prosecution misconduct on the
dignitary harm to the individual before it makes manifest this
fundamental guarantee. Recentering the court’s analysis on the
dignitary harm, as opposed to whether a trial is infected, will
better empower courts to constitutionally regulate the state’s
efforts to demean the dignity of the persons before them.
Reorienting around an individual’s dignity interests is also in line
with the Court’s more recent affirmations of its commitment to
protect individual rights against majoritarian attacks on
fundamental dignitary interests. “ [O]ur laws and tradition afford
constitutional protection to personal decisions relating to
marriage, procreation, contraception, family relationships, child
rearing, and education.”125 The Court has repeatedly described
why this protection is at the core of our constitutional democracy:
These matters, involving the most intimate and personal
choices a person may make in a lifetime, choices central to
personal dignity and autonomy, are central to the liberty
protected by the Fourteenth Amendment. At the heart of
liberty is the right to define one’s own concept of existence,
of meaning, of the universe, and of the mystery of human
life. Beliefs about these matters could not define the
attributes of personhood were they formed under
compulsion of the State.126
Thus, the Court has reviewed with heightened scrutiny and
held unconstitutional attacks on human dignity that are related
to these core aspects of personhood in the contexts of same-sex
marriage and criminalization of same-sex sexual conduct.
Perhaps most poignantly, with regards to same-sex relationships,
the Court has condemned states and state actors when they
engage in behavior that may “raise the inevitable inference that
the disadvantage imposed is born of animosity toward the class of

the adaptability of its great principles to cope with current problems and current
needs.”).
124
Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 578–79 (noting the founders did not “presume to have
th[e] insight” to know “liberty in its manifold possibilities”).
125
Id. at 574.
126
Id. (quoting Planned Parenthood of Southeastern Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833,
851 (1992)).

2021]

DEATH BY DEHUMANIZATION

1071

persons affected.”127
This is because “if the constitutional
conception of ‘equal protection of the laws’ means anything, it
must at the very least mean that a bare . . . desire to harm a
politically unpopular group cannot constitute a legitimate
governmental interest.”128 To do so would make “a class of persons
a stranger to [our] laws,” demeaning them as citizens and their
very personhood.129
CONCLUSION
It is against this backdrop that we propose providing the same
searching, dignity-centered scrutiny of prosecution arguments
that implicate a person’s gender and sexual identity that the
courts have traditionally applied to race. Just as the judiciary will
not tolerate racial animus in a prosecutor’s argument for a
conviction or sentence of death and will set aside a conviction if
racial bias plays a substantial role in striking a single potential
juror, so too must the courts act with unceasing vigilance to
eliminate the harmful use of stereotyping and bigotry.
When the state engages in even a single instance of such
misconduct, the injured party should be relieved of any obligation
to demonstrate the harm inherent to it. Use of the tropes,
stereotypes, and bigoted arguments discussed supra should create
a presumption in favor of a new trial. At most, it should be the
state’s obligation to explain why the misconduct was not, in fact,
injurious to the individual.
Reframing the legal discourse to the dignitary harm to the
individual, instead of how a trial might be “infected,” will provide
a more consistent approach to state use of suspect classifications
generally. And, more specifically, doing so would give fuller
meaning to the Constitution’s guarantee that the persons whose
lives and liberty are at stake are treated with dignity.
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Romer v. Evans, 517 U.S. 620, 634 (1996).
U.S. Dep’t of Agriculture v. Moreno, 413 U.S. 528, 534 (1973) (emphasis
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